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“Grotian moment” – as envisaged by the father of international law, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645),
the term signifies a legal development that is so significant that it can create new customary
international law or radically transform the interpretation of treaty-based law. Modern
international war crimes trials have the potential to give rise to such Grotian moments
related to international humanitarian law, human rights law, and international criminal
procedure. This award-winning Website features key documents, breaking news, and expert
debate and commentary on issues and developments related to the major international war
crimes trials of our time, including the trials of the Khmer Rouge leaders before the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the trial of Charles Taylor before the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the trials of the Ba’ath Party Leaders before the Iraqi
High Tribunal.
January 17th, 2010
First Comprehensive Summary of the IHT Merchants Case now available from Grotian Moment BlogWe are pleased to post Judge Ra’id Juhi’s comprehensive English summary of the Iraqi High Tribunal's Merchants Case, the third case to be tried by the Tribunal. Little has so far been written about the case and its judgment has not yet been translated into English. Judge Ra’id, who served as the IHT’s Chief Investigative Judge for the previous Dujail and Anfal cases, is currently Distinguished Jurist in Residence at Case Western Reserve University School of Law (home of the Grotian Moment Blog). The Merchants Case featured former Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz as a defendant, along with Al Hassan al-Majid (“Chemical Ali”), Watban Ibrahim (Saddam’s half brother and chief adviser), and Sabawi Ibrahim (Saddam’s half brother and former intelligence chief) and several others who faced charges stemming from the 1992 executions of 42 merchants accused by the Ba’athist Regime of being behind a sharp increase in food prices when the country was under strict UN sanctions following the invasion of Kuwait. The presiding judge of the Merchants trial, Raouf Abdul-Rahman, had previously presided over the Dujail trial which was the subject of the award-winning book “Enemy of the State” (St. Martin’s Press, 2008) by Grotian Moment Expert Bloggers Michael Scharf and Michael Newton ( see http://www.enemyofthestatebook.com ). In March 2009, the Iraqi High Tribunal issued its verdict in the Merchants case: Taraq Aziz and Al Hassan al-Majid were each found guilty and sentence to fifteen years, while Watban Ibrahim and Sabawi Ibrahim were sentence to death. As described in Judge Ra’id’s detailed analysis, the judgment raises a host of novel issues which are sure to be of interest to scholars and practitioners of international criminal law. Posted @ 4:00 PM | Other IHT Cases | 5 Comments | 0 Trackbacks June 30th, 2009
A Preview of the Karadzic CaseIn the first major development of the Radovan Karadzic case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Defense team (led by Attorney Peter Robinson) has filed a Pre-Trial Brief (under Karadzic's name). The brief, which can be read here, details the defenses Karadzic will rely on at trial and provides a comprehensive preview of the defense case. A recent one-hour radio discussion with Peter Robinson, Prof. Michael Scharf (Case), and Prof. Mike Newton (Vanderbilt) about the defense of Radovan Karadzic can be heard here. Posted @ 10:35 AM | Experts Debate the Issues: The Radovan Karadzic Trial | 0 Comments | 0 Trackbacks January 30th, 2009
The Post-Dujail Trials Before the Iraqi High TribunalBy Michael Scharf Posted @ 5:24 PM | Experts Debate the Issues: The Dujail Trial | 1 Comment | 0 Trackbacks October 8th, 2008
Anfal Campaign Appeals Chamber Opinion Now Available On Grotian MomentOn September 4, 2007, the Iraqi High Tribunal Appellate Chamber issued a twenty-eight page decision in the “Anfal Campaign Case,” rejecting the various grounds for appeal and upholding the convictions of “Chemical Ali” (Ali Hassan al-Majid) and five other military leaders of Saddam Hussein’s regime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes related to their roles in a three-year crackdown of northern Iraqi Kurds known as the Anfal campaign. The Iraqi High Tribunal and Regime Crimes Liaison Office have provided the English Translation of the Anfal Campaign Appellate Chamber Opinion to Case Western Reserve University School of Law to post on the Grotian Moment Website for world wide access. This is the only place on the internet that the English Translation of the Opinion is available. The Appellate Chamber Opinion, which includes a detailed analysis of the defendant’s culpability for genocide, is of special significance because, aside from the Nuremberg Tribunal and Rwanda Tribunal, this is the only other war crimes tribunal to convict persons of the offense of Genocide, the worst crime known to humankind. Posted @ 1:38 AM | Experts Debate the Issues: The Anfal Trial | 0 Comments | 0 Trackbacks August 22nd, 2008
The end of impunity?The end of impunity? Posted @ 8:19 PM | Experts Debate the Issues: The Radovan Karadzic Trial | 14 Comments | 0 Trackbacks March 7th, 2008
Transcript of Anfal Trial Judges 1/29/08 Presentation at Case Western Reserve Now Available on Grotian MomentOn June 24, 2007, the Iraqi High Tribunal handed down its decision in the Anfal Campaign trial, convicting “Chemical Ali” (Ali Hassan al-Majid) and five other high ranking military leaders of the former Iraqi Regime of international crimes related to their roles in a 1980s crackdown against northern Iraqi Kurds (English version of Judgment available at http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/anfal/opinion.asp). On Tuesday, January 29, 2008, Case Western Reserve University School of Law hosted a two-hour live presentation by the President/Chief Appeals Judge of the Iraqi High Tribunal, the five judges who presided over the Anfal Campaign trial, and the Prosecutor who tried the case. This trip to the United States marked their first public appearance outside of Iraq. Through a translator, the Judges and Prosecutor discussed the challenges that they faced, the precedent that their historic judgment sets, and the question of whether the proceedings were fair. They also discussed the controversy surrounding the pending execution of “Chemical Ali” -- an issue that has been front page news this week. We have just posted the transcript of this extraordinary session (including Q and A) for world-wide viewing on the Grotian Moment Blog. (Click here). Posted @ 12:19 PM | Experts Debate the Issues: The Anfal Trial | 3 Comments | 0 Trackbacks February 6th, 2008
No Chaos in this Courtroom!
Posted @ 7:46 PM | Experts Debate the Issues: The Charles Taylor Trial | 11 Comments | 0 Trackbacks January 16th, 2008
Anfal Trial Judgement Now Available On Grotian MomentOn June 24, 2007, the Iraqi High Tribunal convicted “Chemical Ali” (Ali Hassan al-Majid) and five other military leaders of Saddam Hussein’s regime of international crimes related to their roles in a three-year crackdown of northern Iraqi Kurds known as the Anfal campaign. The Tribunal’s judgment marks one of the only times in history individuals have been convicted of genocide - the worst crime known to humankind. Posted @ 12:43 PM | Experts Debate the Issues: The Anfal Trial | 3 Comments | 0 Trackbacks October 9th, 2007
Why the Cambodia Tribunal Matters to the International CommunityWhy the Cambodia Tribunal Matters to the International Community Posted @ 3:48 PM | Experts Debate the Issues: Khmer Rouge Genocide Trials | 9 Comments | 0 Trackbacks October 2nd, 2007
Playing The Defence Game - The Trial of Charles TaylorMark Ellis I am driven to the conclusion that I will not receive a fair trial before the Special Court at this point. It is therefore with great regret that I must decline to attend any further hearings until adequate time and facilities are provided to my Defence team and until my other long-standing reasonable complaints are dealt with. It follows that I must terminate instructions to my legal representatives in this matter. Despite my complete confidence in their ability and competence, I must ask that they cease to represent me before the Special Court and instruct them accordingly. Mr. Khan also presented a letter to the Registrar from Taylor that formally terminated him as counsel and declared that Taylor would represent himself from that point forward. Taylor also complained, through Mr. Khan, of a prior inability to consult with the Principal Defender. Mr. Khan recited the composition of Taylor’s legal team, noting that he was the only counsel, and that he was supported by two legal assistants and a pro bono legal assistant who worked in Liberia part-time; the defence team also benefited from two investigators — one international and one Liberian. The Court directed Mr. Khan to remain present during the current proceedings and to continue serving as Taylor’s legal representative: “As of today we direct that Mr. Khan continue to represent Mr. Taylor who has absented himself voluntarily.” Despite this directive, Mr. Khan insisted upon leaving the Court, citing the mandates of Article 18(A) and of Article 18(D) of the Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel. Article 18(A) states, “Subject to sub-paragraph (B), Defence Counsel shall not represent a client if Defence Counsel’s representation is: (i) terminated by the client. Mr. Khan noted what he deemed a caveat contained in Article 18(D). This provision states, If representation by Defence Counsel is to be terminated or withdrawn, unless otherwise ordered by a Chamber such termination or withdrawal shall not take effect until a replacement Defence Counsel is engaged by the client or assigned by the Principal Defender, or the client has notified the Registrar in writing of his intention to conduct his own defence. Mr. Khan argued before the Court that Taylor complied with the demands of Article 18, and that he was no longer ethically able to function as legal representative. The Court countered that its directive superseded counsel’s code of conduct, citing Rule 45(D). This rule demands that, “Any request for replacement of an assigned counsel shall be made to the Principal Defender. Under exceptional circumstances, the request may be made to a Chamber upon good cause being shown and after having been satisfied that the request is not designed to delay the proceedings.” Despite these urgings by the Court, Mr. Khan exited the courtroom. The presiding judge then appointed the acting Duty Counsel, Charles Jalloh, counsel for the duration of opening statements. There is no evidence that Mr. Khan was held in contempt of court for his decision to ignore the Court’s ruling, even though it is the Court that has final authority to remove appointed defence lawyers. Mr. Taylor indicated that he would represent himself, although he did not appear in court. The Court proceeded with the opening statements of the Prosecutor. Following the Prosecutor’s opening statements, the Duty Counsel enumerated several issues that, from Taylor’s perspective, needed resolution: (1) the procurement of funding sufficient “to assemble a good legal Defence team to meet the size and complexity of Mr. Taylor’s case”; (2) the need to properly fund investigations on behalf of the defence; (3) the status of those comprising the legal team for the defence (e.g., the employment of QCs); (4) the arrangement of a meeting between Taylor and the Principal Defender. In ruling on the matter of the Principal Defender, the Court issued the following directive: The Registrar is directed to immediately facilitate the Principal Defender to travel to The Hague for the purpose of speaking with Mr Taylor and sorting out his defence problems. The Registrar is further directed to ensure that logistically the accused has adequate facilities, in accordance with Article 17 of the Statute, without further delay. Several weeks later, on June 24, 2007, Mr. Taylor again boycotted his trial. He was represented by Duty Counsel (Jalloh) and the Principal Defender, Vincent Nmehielle. Before making any statements, Mr. Nmehielle noted that both he and Mr. Jalloh would be addressing the Court from the position of the Defence Office, “but not addressing the Court for the accused as such.” Mr. Nmehielle stated that he had met with Taylor in the Netherlands since travelling north from Freetown, and that Taylor had expressed deep concerns with the protection of his rights to fair trial, resolving “to return and to participate in the proceedings before the Court if his concerns, as articulated to the Trial Chamber on the 4th of June, are addressed.” He also relayed that, through the course of their discussions, Taylor was advised that self-representation was neither in his best interests nor those of justice more generally, and that Taylor described in detail the kind of legal team that he felt would be necessary for the mounting of a proper defence. One such demand involved the employment of a leading counsel bearing the rank of QC. Mr. Taylor had rejected all attorneys compiled by the Principal Defender on a list of possible replacement counsel. Mr. Nmehielle also conceded that Taylor had expressed concerns with the adequacy of his legal counsel for some three months prior, and Mr. Nmehielle emphasized the fiscal constraints that had consistently hindered efforts to assemble the calibre and breadth of individuals needed to ameliorate any and all Article 17 concerns. In her response, Brenda J Hollis of the prosecution argued that, while any accused is certainly entitled to worthy representation, “he is not entitled to determine who that representation will be presented by, nor the exact title of the people who will provide that representation.” On the topic of self-representation, she observed that it should not be an issue because an accused such as this one cannot on one hand boycott the proceedings by refusing to attend and on the other hand say that he is representing himself. If he is boycotting the proceedings, he is not representing himself and so that, at this point at least, is not an issue. In deciding the matters brought before the Court, the presiding judge accepted the fact that Mr. Taylor had recanted his previous declaration to represent himself and issued both short- and long-term orders. In the short-term, the Principal Defender was instructed to comply with Article 24(D) (of Directive on Assignment of Counsel) and assign new counsel, either from the list previously compiled or else from the Office of the Principal Defender. The Principal Defender was also directed to retain the remaining members from the original defence team in order to assist with any transition. Should no new counsel be assigned by the time the Court reconvened on 3 July, Jalloh was to represent Taylor on that date. In the long-term, the Registrar was instructed to assemble a competent legal team for Taylor by 31 July. The team is to have the following composition: One lead counsel of the qualities described or mentioned in Rule 45(C) of the rules, two co-counsel of the quality described in Rule 45(C) of the rules, and one senior investigator at a P4 level. These will supplement the residual members of the team of Charles Taylor as they now exist, the various assistants. On 3 July, the Court addressed an urgent motion filed jointly by the Prosecutor and the Principal Defender. The motion was filed on 28 June, and a written decision was issued on that same day. The motion requested that the Trial Chamber delay proceedings until 20 August. The petition justified the request on the following bases: (1) the short time with which the Duty Counsel would have to prepare for 3 July, particularly given “the fact that he has hitherto not been privy to the Prosecution material disclosed to the Defence and has no administrative support in the Hague”; (2) two expert witnesses scheduled to testify on behalf of the prosecution had been challenged by former counsel, and Duty Counsel was not privy to the reasons underlying this challenge. Consequently, the Court ordered the addition of four people to Taylor’s defence team and that a new lead counsel be appointed. The Court ruled: The Chamber agrees that to compel Duty Counsel to represent the accused during this one week, without affording him adequate administrative support or time to prepare, would indeed amount to a violation of Mr Taylor’s fair-trial rights in as far as counsel could not be expected to effectively cross-examine the witnesses, Prosecution witnesses, nor effectively challenge the Prosecution evidence. The Court first postponed the trial for another month in order to give new defence counsel sufficient time to prepare for trial. It then agreed to postpone the trial until January 2008. In addition, the Court increased to approximately $100,000 a month the funds allocated to Mr. Taylor to defend himself. This is despite the evidence that Taylor controls approximately $100 million in unfrozen annual earnings from the diamond and timber trade. 1 However, it seems that the delay of Mr. Taylor’s trial is based, in large part, on the obstinate behaviour of Mr. Taylor himself. It is extraordinary that the Court permitted Mr. Taylor, at the “eleventh hour,” to obstruct Court proceedings. The Court erred in not immediately assigning defence counsel to Mr. Taylor, “in the interest of justice.” The Court’s decision was also confusing considering its earlier rulings addressing whether Mr. Taylor had sufficient and adequate defence support prior to the start of the trial. On January 23, 2007, the Defense sought an Order by the Trial Chamber that would direct the Registrar “to provide offices or financial support for offices in both The Hague, The Netherlands, and Monrovia, Liberia.” The Trial Chamber determined that it was not necessary to issue a specific Order to the Registrar because the Registry was already making an effort to establish adequate facilities in The Hague. The Trial Chamber also determined that it was not necessary to establish an office in Monrovia to help the Defense conduct investigations in Liberia. In assigning additional defence support and funding only after Mr. Taylor boycotted the proceedings, the Court displayed an institutional weakness for handling this crucial aspect of the trial. What is equally perplexing about the Court’s decision is the fact that cases before other international tribunals have already dealt directly with a defendant’s failure to appear. These defendants were certainly not given the latitude afforded to Mr. Taylor. 1 Liberia Moves to Seize Taylor Assets, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu, July 13, 2007. Posted @ 4:24 PM | Experts Debate the Issues: The Charles Taylor Trial | 13 Comments | 0 Trackbacks September 27th, 2007
Into the Dark Heart of the Khmer Rouge TribunalEDITORIAL NOTE: THIS IS THE INAUGURAL ESSAY FOR THE "GROTIAN MOMENT: CAMBODIA GENOCIDE TRIALS BLOG." OUR PANEL INCLUDES EXPERTS, LIKE PROFESSOR JOHN HALL, WHO ARE HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE CAMBODIA TRIBUNAL, AND THOSE WHO SUPPORT THE PROJECT, BELIEVING THINGS ARE PROGRESSING AS WELL AS COULD BE EXPECTED IN LIGHT OF THE MANY CHALLENGES. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THIS INITIAL ESSAY WILL LAUNCH A SPIRITED DEBATE, BOTH AMONG OUR "GROTIAN" BLOGGERS AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE -- TO APPEAR IN THE COMING DAYS AND MONTHS ON THIS WEBSITE. Posted @ 1:45 AM | Experts Debate the Issues: Khmer Rouge Genocide Trials | 6 Comments | 0 Trackbacks March 27th, 2007
Grotian Moment UpdateAs the Iraqi High Tribunal trials proceed, this website will continue to post breaking news and expert commentary. We have plans to expand the Grotian Moment Blog to cover the proceedings of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia when the Cambodia Tribunal's Rules are promulgated, indictments are issued, and pre-trial proceedings commence in coming months. Meanwhile, several of our expert bloggers ("the Grotians") are also participating in the newly launched International Association of Penal Law's "AIDP Blog," which focuses on current developments in international and comparative criminal law. We hope you will continue to post your comments on the Grotian Moment, and also visit the new AIDP Blog: www.aidpblog.org. Posted @ 10:56 PM | Experts Debate the Issues: The Anfal Trial | 2 Comments | 0 Trackbacks February 19th, 2007
Ten Lessons from the Saddam TrialTen Lessons from the Saddam Trial Generated from the October 7, 2006 Cleveland Experts Meeting Chaired by Michael Scharf Co-Rapporteurs: Gregory McNeal, Christopher Rassi, and Brianne Draffin Introduction It is often said that just as courts try cases, so too do cases try courts. As the first trial before the Iraqi High Tribunal, the Dujail Case was the test-run for this novel judicial institution. The Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) joins the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the first of a new breed of domestic tribunals that combine elements of international and domestic war crimes courts. Although it sits in Baghdad and its judges are all Iraqi, the IHT is independent from the ordinary Iraqi court system, it is assisted by international advisers, and its constituent instruments incorporate the definitions of crimes and due process rights contained in the statutes of the existing international war crimes tribunals and stipulate that the precedent of those tribunals are to guide the decisions of the IHT. In the future, internationalized domestic tribunals like the IHT may play an increasingly important role in the growing accountability web for atrocity crimes that also includes the International Criminal Court, the Security Council-created ad hoc war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the U.N.-created hybrid war crimes tribunals for Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia, and ordinary national courts. After the Nuremberg Trial sixty years ago, Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson reported to President Truman that despite the many errors and missteps that occurred during the proceedings, he was consoled by the fact that the lessons from the WWII war crimes tribunal would be instructive for the future. In that spirit, on October 6-7, 2006, the Frederick K. Cox Center at Case Western Reserve University School of Law hosted an international conference and experts meeting titled “Lessons from the Saddam Trial.” The meeting was co-sponsored by the International Bar Association and the Irish Centre for Human Rights, and was designated a Centennial Regional Meeting of the American Society of International Law, a Regional Conference of the International Law Association (American Branch), and the Annual Meeting of the International Association of Penal Law (American National Section). In addition to a number of leading academics, the two dozen expert participants included the Ambassador of Iraq to the United States, the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, the Executive Director of the International Bar Association, the former Director of the Regime Crimes Liaison Office, the Deputy Director of the State Department Office for War Crimes Issues, a human rights observer who attended the Dujail trial, an advisor to Saddam Hussein’s defense team, the former Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the legal advisor to the Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the former Principal Public Defender of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the former Chair of the Drafting Committee for the International Criminal Court. Although the views of the individuals who participated in the conference and experts meeting diverged on many points, they all agreed that much can be learned from the way the Dujail trial unfolded, and that these lessons can help improve the way the Iraqi High Tribunal tackles its upcoming trials, as well as the way the international community can help domestic prosecutions of former leaders accused of atrocities in other parts of the world. While not specifically endorsed by the participants, this document reflects the general points of consensus that emerged from the experts meeting. The articles contained in the upcoming symposium issue of the Case Journal of International Law (available in August 2007) provide further elaboration and analysis of these ten lessons. Lesson # 1: There should be a presumption against undertaking domestic war crimes trials in countries languishing in a conflict environment. The International Criminal Court’s “complementarity regime” reflects international recognition that domestic trials have advantages over international trials and are to be preferred unless the national courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute. At the same time, it must be recognized that in the best of circumstances, undertaking international war crimes trials is arduous; in a country plagued by sectarian violence and devoid of reliable security mechanisms, the premature launching of such a trial can be reckless and potentially futile. It also runs the risk of negating the potential benefits to the broader criminal law system. In such circumstances, a more responsible and viable option may have been to utilize a neutral jurisdiction, preferably in the relevant region. In the current IHT trials, extreme and immediate steps must be taken to guarantee the protection of defense counsel, as well as the judges, prosecutors and witnesses – whether they desire such protection or not. Lesson #2: Post-conflict countries that do undertake domestic war crimes trials need unbiased international assistance. It is a misnomer to refer to the Iraqi High Tribunal as a “domestic” court. Behind the scenes, the United States played a crucial role in drafting the Court’s Statute, collecting evidence to be used by the prosecution, and providing both security and financing to the Court. Although the United States, as an occupying force, should not have been the one to unilaterally play this role, international assistance for a domestic war crimes tribunal following the fall of an authoritarian regime is indispensable. In the future, transitional justice should be a key goal that attracts legal and administrative support from across the international spectrum. Serious consideration should be given to foregoing the death penalty as the price for obtaining international support and involvement. The international community should provide substantial training in international criminal law to jurists, including defense attorneys, serving on domestic war crimes tribunals. An international perspective on substantive and procedural law concerning crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity is essential, and international best practices serve to supplement established domestic norms to provide an integrated model. Lesson #3: Steps should be taken to further internationalize the Iraqi High Tribunal. Like the Statute of the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 3(5) of the IHT Statute provides for the appointment of one or more foreign judges to join the Iraqi judges on the bench, but without explanation none were ever appointed. Such an appointment of a distinguished Arabic-speaking judge from the region would greatly promote the perception of the IHT as a fair and competent judicial institution, without sacrificing the essential Iraqi character of the tribunal. In addition, the Statute provides for the appointment of international advisers to assist the judges, prosecutor, and defense team. To date, the identities of the non-US advisers working with the Tribunal have been kept confidential for their protection, but this has led to the misperception that the only foreign advisers are members of the US Department of Justice Regime Crimes Liaison Office, which in turn makes the Tribunal appear to be an American-controlled enterprise. In future trials, more advisors selected by respected NGOs such as the International Bar Association should be recruited to assist the Tribunal, and their contribution (if not their identities) needs to be made public. Lesson #4: Steps should be taken to strengthen the independence of the Iraqi High Tribunal. An independent and impartial court is a fundamental prerequisite for meeting international standards of fairness in a trial. Any appearance of government influence is a damning indictment of a court’s independence. During the Saddam trial, there were several instances in which the government made inappropriate comments and attempted to interfere with the proceedings. Article 4(4) of the IHT Statute, which provides that the Iraqi Presidency Council may transfer judges from the IHT to the Higher Judicial Council for any reason, should be amended. Judges should only be removable for cause and only through a decision of the other IHT judges, not the unfettered whim of the Executive branch. In addition, Article 33, which provides that no person who was a member of the Ba’ath party shall serve as a judge or other officer of the IHT, should be revised to make clear that removal of judges on grounds of former Ba’ath party membership shall occur only via the IHT’s internal fact finding and disciplinary procedures. Lesson #5: Domestic war crimes trials should be kept short and focused. Domestic war crimes courts should be judicious in deciding the charges brought against a defendant, particularly a Head of State, and in deciding the best sequence of cases. The Court must be very conscious of the balance between lengthy delays needed to adequately prepare for trial and the rights of potential defendants held for extended periods pending trial. The legal predisposition to charge all the crimes attributable to an individual in one conglomerated case can lead to overly long trials, while the practice of charging specific situations will generally necessitate repetitive trials of senior officials. In any event, the length of trial will be a critical factor in the public perceptions of the process. The IHT was correct in selecting, as its first case against Saddam Hussein, a relatively straightforward incident of criminality. The Dujail case was manageable and the documentary evidence was remarkably strong. This enabled the Court to more directly focus its case. On the other hand, the execution of Saddam Hussein following the Dujail verdict deprived victims of seeing him stand trial on other much more serious charges. Lesson #6: Pre-Trial Motions need to be resolved as they arise. Consistent with Iraqi and international law, Saddam’s defense counsel filed a series of motions addressing issues such as the impartiality of the judges and access to witnesses and documents. One of the most glaring shortcomings of the Court was its failure to articulate a response to these motions until the final Trial Chamber opinion was issued at the end of the Dujail trial. The Court’s silence significantly weakened its transparency and undermined the credibility of the judicial process. In future trials, the IHT should make it a practice to issue written opinions addressing such issues as they arise, consistent with the normal practice of Iraqi courts and the international war crimes tribunals. In addition, the IHT should maintain a regularly updated list of all motions filed and all scheduling decisions. Lesson #7: Domestic War Crimes Tribunals must utilize accepted tactics to maintain control of the courtroom without trammeling on the rights of the defense. Trying former leaders is always a messy affair, especially when a decision has been made to televise the proceedings gavel-to-gavel, and the defendants have indicated an intention to disrupt the trial, distract public attention from the evidence against them, and turn the televised trial into a political stage. To ensure decorum and protect the integrity of the process, the judges in a domestic war crimes trial should be prepared to take a number of steps, which have been undertaken successfully by other tribunals. First, stand-by-counsel should be appointed at the start of the trial. They should be trained and assisted by international advisors. At the start of the trial, the judges should explain the existence of the stand-by counsel, release general information about their qualifications and experience, and describe the conditions in which they will be asked to take over for retained defense counsel. The use of such stand-by counsel had been successfully employed at the Yugoslavia Tribunal, Rwanda Tribunal, and Special Court for Sierra Leone. The very existence of such stand-by public defenders can deter misconduct by the Defense, since the defense lawyers know they can be replaced if necessary at a moment’s notice. In addition, if misconduct persists after due warning, the Tribunal should not hesitate to hold retained counsel in contempt of court and subject them to appropriate disciplinary sanctions for conduct that would merit such action in an ordinary court. In such cases, the Presiding Judge needs to dispassionately explain in open court why the steps taken were warranted. Second, defendants must be warned that they will lose their right of self-representation (or in the Iraqi context, their right to ask follow up questions after their lawyers are finished questioning a witness) and may face expulsion and other sanctions if they act disruptively or inappropriately in the courtroom. Persistent disruption after such a warning should result in temporary exclusion, followed by a calibrated response proportionate to the degree and persistence of disruption. If the defendant is expelled from the courtroom, he must be permitted to follow the courtroom proceedings and be able to speak with counsel remotely via communications link. Lesson #8: The IHT Appeals process must be sufficiently deliberative. The timing and substance of the Appeals Chamber decision was one of the most controversial aspects of the Dujail trial. The IHT should maintain a verbatim written transcript of court proceedings, which should be made available to the prosecution and defense in a timely manner so that they can prepare an appeal. Sufficient time must be allocated to all parties to raise specific allegations of factual or legal error. The Appeals Chamber decisions must sufficiently address each legal and factual issue raised in a detailed manner. The time required to compose the Appeals Chamber decision should be sufficient to prepare the opinion, and must not be driven by external political or emotional factors unrelated to the facts of the case. Lesson #9: Domestic War Crimes Tribunals must make gender justice a priority. Domestic war crimes tribunals should ensure fair representation of women judges, prosecutors and other staff. They must also include individuals in the Registry (including victims and witnesses units), Chambers, and Prosecution with legal expertise in sexual and gender violence, as well as expertise in trauma related to crimes of sexual violence. Such provisions recognize the fact that many of the victims of war crimes and related atrocities are women, and that women jurists, prosecutors, and other court staff bring important perspectives to the gender-crimes that such Tribunals should be prosecuting. War crimes tribunals are designed not just to prosecute the leaders of regimes that have engaged in mass violations of humanitarian law, but also to serve as a model for a newly emerging judicial system by employing international rules for the protection of the rights of the defendant and standards of due process. They should also serve as a model of gender equality, by appointing women to serve visible roles as judges, prosecutors, and other figures of prominence. Domestic war crimes tribunals should disclose the gender representation of each trial bench, along with other basic information about the qualifications and experience of the judges (but not put them at risk by disclosing their identities). The same should be disclosed with regard to the prosecution office, registry and defense bar. Just as it is important that prominent members of government be women, so too should women be seen playing a prominent role in war crimes tribunals. Domestic war crimes tribunals should also provide, both before, and during trials, trainings for judges, prosecutors and other tribunal players, on gender sensitivity and dealing with sexual violence. Efforts must also be made to insure that such tribunals provide an enabling environment for victims of sexual violence prior to, and during their testimony, and keep victims of sexual violence informed about court proceedings thereafter. Prosecutors and investigating judges must make prosecuting and investigating gender crimes a priority from the outset. Holding perpetrators of mass violations against women accountable for their acts has been a slow and tortuous process. Experience has shown that including women judges in war crimes tribunals particularly makes a difference. Tribunals should find creative and pro-active ways to bring around a local populace, rather than concluding that said society is just "not ready for this". Outreach to women in the diaspora should also be considered where it may be thought to be particularly difficult to enlist local women in visible roles. While gender parity and justice is never convenient, it is a fundamental aspect for lasting and credible justice. Lesson # 10: Domestic War Crimes Tribunals must make effective public outreach a priority. Domestic war crimes tribunals should create a public outreach office to provide regular briefings on the Court and trial developments. Not only would this enhance public knowledge about Court proceedings, it would impede the constant speculation, misinformation, and rumors that so often overwhelm high-profile trials. The IHT failed to create an effective public outreach office. Consequently, Iraqi citizens and the international community were essentially left to use their imaginations when judging the Court’s proceedings. As evidenced by the decision to televise the proceedings, the IHT was designed in part to serve an educative function. But the procedural decisions of the IHT were usually shrouded in mystery, as little attempt was made to clarify the many public misconceptions as they arose during the Dujail trial. If the Iraqi people are ever going to feel ownership over the IHT proceedings, and if the international community is ever going to accept the Tribunal as legitimate and fair, they need to fully understand what is going on in the courtroom, and the message should not have to be filtered through the press. To remedy this problem in the future, the Presiding Judge should explain procedural decisions in open court, even if this is not traditionally done in Iraqi trials. Where decisions are made in closed sessions, explanation for going into closed session should be given in open court, and a summary of what occurred in the closed session should also be delivered in open court after closed session. In addition, the IHT should appoint an experienced lawyer or experienced journalist with a legal background to head the Public Outreach Office (a role eventually undertaken by Chief Investigating Judge Ra’id). The IHT Public Outreach Officer should issue an official statement every day of the trial (in both Arabic and where resources allow in English and/or French), explaining what went on that day and answering the questions that the public and press are likely to have about the day’s proceedings. Such official press statements, together with trial exhibits, transcripts, budgets, annual reports, and other court documents, should be posted (in both Arabic and where resources allow in English and/or French) on the Tribunal’s website on a daily basis for world-wide viewing. Domestic War Crimes Tribunals should also run public service announcements on local and international television and radio, hold town hall meetings via the radio, the tribunal website, and where security permits throughout the country. They should develop a media program with workshops, bringing in selected domestic and international journalists to cover the tribunal and its trials. They should prepare, publish, and disseminate to key stakeholders and the public a handbook titled “what you need to know about the [domestic"> war crimes tribunal.” Public outreach should focus not only on the particulars of the day to day proceedings, but also on the importance of the right to a fair trial, and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Posted @ 1:10 AM | Experts Debate the Issues: The Anfal Trial | 96 Comments | 0 Trackbacks February 14th, 2007
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour's amicus brief on the issue of capital punishmentUnited Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour's amicus brief in the Matter of Sentencing of Taha Yassin Ramadan. Posted @ 4:18 PM | Experts Debate the Issues: The Anfal Trial | 15 Comments | 0 Trackbacks |
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